Behavioral reconsolidation interference with episodic memory within-subjects is elusive. by Levy, Daniel A et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ynlme
Behavioral reconsolidation interference with episodic memory within-
subjects is elusive
Daniel A. Levya,⁎, Rotem Mikab, Cecilia Radzyminskia, Shir Ben-Zvia,c, Roni Tibond
a Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel
bDepartment of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
c Sackler School of Medicine, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
dMRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, University of Cambridge, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Reconsolidation
Memory
Episodic
Interference
Recognition
A B S T R A C T
In studies of behavioral reconsolidation interference, reactivation of a consolidated memory using some form of
reminder is followed by the presentation of new information that can cause interference with that memory.
Under these conditions, the interference not only impairs retrieval by indirect processes such as cue interference,
but supposedly disrupts the original memory trace directly. Almost all studies of behavioral reconsolidation
interference in episodic memory in humans have employed between-subjects paradigms, and deduced reminder
eﬀects from intrusion errors. Such studies might introduce confounds arising, for example, from diﬀerences in
retrieval strategies engendered by the pre-test treatments. We therefore set out to examine whether behavioral
reconsolidation interference in episodic memory might be demonstrated within-subjects and by direct memory
strength rather than intrusion errors. In three separate experiments, we attempted to disrupt reconsolidation of
episodic object-picture memory using a reminder+ retroactive interference manipulation. We applied the
manipulation over three consecutive days, using a forced-choice recognition test without intrusions from in-
terfering learning, keeping all other study and test parameters constant. No eﬀects of reminder-potentiated
interference were observed for measures of accuracy, response times, subjective expressions of recollection, or
levels of conﬁdence, as substantiated by Bayesian analyses. These results highlight the diﬃculty of observing
clear behavioral reconsolidation interference eﬀects within-subjects in human episodic memory, and provide
some indications of what might be boundary conditions for its demonstration.
1. Introduction
One of the most interesting topics of inquiry in contemporary
memory research is the phenomenon of reconsolidation. Converging
evidence from a variety of experimental paradigms in several animal
species, and more recently in humans, indicates that when consolidated
memory traces are activated, they become labile, and subject to mod-
iﬁcation or erasure if reconsolidation processes are disrupted (Dudai,
2012; Lee, Nader, & Schiller, 2017). A promising aspect of this phe-
nomenon is its therapeutic potential – the prospect of modifying or even
erasing aversive or maladaptive memories. However, most demon-
strations of memory modiﬁcation through reconsolidation interference
have relied on pharmacological agents, and their use in humans is not
trivial. Therefore, there have been several attempts to disrupt re-
consolidation of human memory by behavioral interventions (reviewed
by Agren, 2014; Hupbach, Gomez, & Nadel, 2015; Schiller & Phelps,
2011, Scully, Napper, & Hupbach, 2017).
In studies of behavioral reconsolidation interference, reactivation of
a consolidated memory using some form of reminder is followed by the
presentation of new information that can cause interference with that
memory. Under these conditions, the interference is supposed not only
to impair retrieval by indirect processes such as cue interference, but to
directly disrupt the original memory trace. Reconsolidation inter-
ference is asserted to have occurred if retrieval of target memory in-
formation is more greatly impaired when interference is preceded by a
reminder compared to a condition in which reminder reactivation was
not followed by new interfering information, or a condition in which
the new information was not preceded by a reminder (Hupbach et al.,
2015; Scully et al., 2017).
Several studies have investigated whether such behavioral re-
consolidation interference may degrade episodic memories (Scully
et al., 2017). Such a process might be especially important for ther-
apeutic interventions to ameliorate intrusive traumatic recollections.
For example, it was recently demonstrated that playing the computer
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game Tetris after reminder activation of memories of a traumatic ﬁlm
reduced subsequent intrusive memories of that ﬁlm (James et al.,
2015). More prosaically, reconsolidation interference in episodic
memory might take the form of source memory deterioration, ex-
empliﬁed by list intrusions during recall. For example, one early study
indicated that learning a new list of objects following the reactivation of
a previously learned list caused items from the second learning to be
mistakenly recalled as having appeared in the ﬁrst list (Hupbach,
Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007).
Almost all studies of behavioral reconsolidation interference in
episodic memory in humans have employed between-subjects para-
digms, comparing eﬀects of treatment groups. While providing valuable
information about the scope of reconsolidation eﬀects, such studies do
not readily enable examination of the physiological bases of the eﬀects
in humans (e.g., by using non-invasive neuroimaging techniques).
Perhaps more fundamentally, if reconsolidation interference eﬀects are
only seen in between-subjects paradigms, it becomes diﬃcult to rule
out possible additional factors that might be responsible for eﬀects on
retrieval, such as strategic changes in retrieval orientation engendered
by preceding reminders. Such potential confounds make it diﬃcult to
determine whether the intervention resulted in modiﬁcation of the
mnemonic representations themselves, as reconsolidation interference
is asserted to cause.
To the best of our knowledge, within-subject examination of epi-
sodic memory reconsolidation interference has rarely been attempted.
In one study (Zhu et al., 2016), incorporating a series of experiments,
participants engaged in pair associate learning in which two cues eli-
cited each response target. In the interference phase, only one of those
cues was manipulated by being associated with a set of additional re-
sponses, either following a strong reminder of the original pairing or
without a reminder. Memory for the targets was subsequently probed
with both the manipulated cue and with the non-manipulated cue. In-
terestingly, the reminder presentation increased the deleterious eﬀect
of interference only on recall elicited by the non-manipulated cue, ex-
cept when the interference was conducted immediately after the
learning phase. Additionally, in this design, two diﬀerent cues are
linked to the same response, thus reducing association strength (i.e., a
blocking eﬀect). Thus, reconsolidation interference in the strict sense
was not observed.
A within-subjects manipulation of selective reminder reactivation
formed part of the design in the study of Hupbach and Dorskind (2014),
along with a between-subjects manipulation, in which some partici-
pants underwent cold-pressor stress intended to interfere with re-
consolidation. The researchers report that the reminder procedure en-
hanced later recall in the control group, but did not aﬀect the stress
group. Thus, while this study demonstrated that selective reminder
reactivation may interact with subsequent stressors, the stressor might
have prevented the memory-enhancing eﬀects of reactivation rather
than speciﬁcally impairing reconsolidation of the reactivated re-
presentations. Additionally, it remains to be determined whether such
eﬀects would be observed in a purely within-subjects paradigm. Simi-
larly, Forcato et al. (2016) also employed a mixed within-subjects
(manipulation of reminder type) and between-subjects (manipulation of
interference) design. They report better subsequent cued recall in the
reactivation group than in the reactivation-interference group in the
syllable-reminder condition but not in the pair-reminder and picture-
reminder conditions. Here too, the eﬀects of the type of reminder were
observed in the context of a between-subjects paradigm. It is therefore
important to assess potential reconsolidation interference eﬀects in a
more basic within-subjects design.
We therefore set out to examine whether behavioral reconsolidation
interference in episodic memory might be demonstrated when both
reminder and interference conditions were manipulated within-sub-
jects. We employed a visual object recognition memory task, in which
participants studied a series of object pictures on Day 1, underwent a
selective reminder/interference manipulation on Day 2, and took a two-
alternative forced choice recognition test requiring discriminating the
originally studied pictures from novel lures (other exemplars of the
same objects), on Day 3. We followed the basic approach of comparing
the eﬀects of post-consolidation interference between a condition in
which target memories were activated immediately before the inter-
ference and a condition in which there was no such activation, and
additionally compared conditions of encoding-alone and encoding with
reminder. The question was whether reminder-potentiated speciﬁc
retroactive interference would most greatly impair subsequent re-
cognition memory compared with the other conditions. As documented
below, however, despite several attempts to titrate reminder strength,
we were unable to ﬁnd evidence that this approach led to re-
consolidation interference as expressed in poorer recognition accuracy,
slower response times, or subjective reports of recollective strength or
conﬁdence.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were 40 healthy young adults (10 males; mean age
22.9 years, SD=1.8 years, range 20–27), with normal or adjusted-to-
normal vision. All were undergraduate students who volunteered in
return for academic requirement credit or payment. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants for a protocol approved by the
Interdisciplinary Center's Institutional Review Board. Five other parti-
cipants were excluded from the analyses: two who did not properly
follow instructions, two whose overall performance was more than 2 SD
weaker than group mean recognition success and close to chance, and
one due to data corruption after the experiment.
2.1.2. Stimulus material
Pictures of 200 simple common objects (e.g., apple, sunglasses, dog)
collected from various internet sites were used as stimuli. Three ver-
sions of each object type (examples in Fig. 1) were edited to be com-
parable in size, detail, and resolution. The three versions of the same
objects were randomly assigned to three lists (A, B, or C), with as-
signment of lists to roles as recognition targets studied on Day 1 and
tested on Day 3, interfering study condition on Day 2, or recognition
test lures on Day 3 counterbalanced across participants.
2.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime 2 (Psychology
Software Tools). The experimental procedures were carried out on three
consecutive days. On the ﬁrst day, after providing informed consent,
participants were serially shown a set of 200 objects onscreen (from one
of the lists A, B or C). They were instructed to memorize the visual
details of these objects for a memory test that would be administered at
Fig. 1. Examples of object picture exemplars employed in all three experiments.
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an unspeciﬁed later time. To facilitate memory formation via deep
encoding, participants made self-paced liking judgements for each ob-
ject on a scale of 1–5, using corresponding buttons on the keyboard,
with 1 indicating “dislike very much” and 5 indicating “like very
much”. Each keypress triggered presentation of the next stimulus fol-
lowing a delay of 500ms. A rest break was provided after each 50
pictures. Participants were instructed to return to the lab at the same
time the following day.
On the second day of the experiment, participants initially per-
formed a reminder activity. They were shown the names of 100 of the
objects they saw the previous day, and asked to report how well they
remember the actual picture of that object from the day before, using
three marked buttons on the keyboard, representing “clearly”/
“hardly”/“not at all”. Thereafter, participants were shown 100 alter-
native object pictures drawn from a second picture set (e.g., partici-
pants who saw list A on Day 1, saw pictures drawn from either lists B or
C). This series consisted of 50 objects for which reminders had been
previously provided in the ﬁrst part of Day 2 (forming the
Reminder+ Interference condition), and another 50 which were not
(forming the Interference Only condition). Participants were instructed
to memorize this second set as well, for a memory test that would be
held on the following day (which was not carried out in practice).
Pilot testing had indicated that interference in the critical recogni-
tion task of Day 3 could be anticipated only if strong interference was
generated on Day 2. That result is in consonance with the report of
Wichert, Wolf, and Schwabe (2013) that multiple interference ex-
posures of new pictures after reactivation of prior learning is necessary
for reconsolidation interference eﬀects to emerge. Therefore, for this
second set of 100 pictures, participants were asked to perform three
tasks with each object picture: liking, symmetry and color judgments,
executed in a ﬁxed order. Since liking judgments were also performed
on Day 1, participants were told not to try to be consistent with their
prior liking ratings. In the second task, color judgment, participants
were asked to indicate, as rapidly and accurately as possible, how many
colors they saw in the picture displayed, using the following buttons
specially labeled on the keyboard; “1–3”/“3–4”/“5+”. In the third task,
symmetry judgement, participants were asked to judge whether each
object is symmetrical (using the “V” key) or non-symmetrical (using the
“X” key). The object picture was re-displayed before each judgment. In
all tasks, each keypress triggered presentation of the next stimulus
following a delay of 500ms. Rest breaks were provided between tasks.
Thus, through the procedures of Day 2, four experimental condi-
tions were created: (1) 50 objects that were only encoded in Day 1 and
not referenced at all on Day 2 (Encoding-only); (2) 50 objects that were
encoded on Day 1 and only reminded on Day 2 (Reminder); (3) 50
objects that were encoded on Day 1, and of which an alternative version
was studied in the second part of Day 2, intended to create interference
in the subsequent recognition test (Interference); (4) 50 objects encoded
on Day 1, and reminded and subsequently interfered with on Day 2
(Reminder+ Interference). Upon completion of the second learning
activity, participants were instructed to return to the lab at the same
time the following day.
On the third day of the experiment, participants performed a two-
alternative forced choice recognition task, in which they were to dis-
criminate between pictures studied on Day 1 and novel alternative
exemplars of the same object, drawn from the third set of pictures that
had not previously been seen. The two alternatives were displayed
horizontally onscreen, with old and new exemplars randomly placed on
either the left or the right side of the screen. Importantly, dis-
criminating the targets from the lures requires detailed memory of the
originally studied items, and cannot rely on gist memory alone.
Participants were asked to use left and right arrows to choose which
object was the one they saw on Day 1. Accuracy and response time
measures were collected. We hypothesized that even if potentiation of
interference by reminders did not aﬀect global recognition accuracy, it
might diminish the sense of episodic recollection of the target stimulus.
Therefore, after choosing the stimulus they believed that they had
studied on the ﬁrst day, participants were asked to indicate whether
they vividly remembered the chosen exemplar with its contextual de-
tails (“Remember” response, indicted by a key marked with the letter
R), or just knew that it was the exemplar that had been studied (“Know”
response, indicated by a key marked with the letter K). That keypress
triggered presentation of the next stimulus, following a delay of 500ms.
A rest break was provided after each 50 trials.
Since object names were used as Day 2 reminders, names that did
not signify the objects for the participant would not be an appropriate
reminder. Therefore, following completion of all memory tests, parti-
cipants were shown pictures from the set they had seen on the ﬁrst day
and asked to record their names. Items for which names were given that
were substantively diﬀerent than the names used for reminders on Day
2 were removed from subsequent analyses for that participant. On
average, 1.7 items per participant were thus removed, with a maximum
of 11 items removed in one participant. Trials in which response times
(RTs) were three standard deviations or more longer than the individual
participant's other RTs were removed from RT analyses.
Measures of accuracy, RTs, and the proportion of 'Remember'
compared to 'Know' responses following correct recognition were sub-
mitted to analyses of variance to examine main eﬀects of reminder and
interference conditions – and crucially, their interaction. These analyses
were accompanied by with planned comparisons testing the critical
prediction that reminders would potentiate reconsolidation inter-
ference, such that memory in the Reminder+ Interference condition
should be weaker than in the Interference condition. As noted below,
observed null eﬀects were examined with Bayesian analyses. All sta-
tistical analyses were performed using R version 3.4.1 and RStudio
Version 1.0153, with packages BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2015), ez
(Lawrence, 2016), and psych (Revelle, 2017).
2.2. Results
We examined the eﬀects of reminder, interference and the interac-
tion between them on accuracy and response times at test, by using a
2×2 repeated measures ANOVA, with Interference (with/without)
and Reminder (with/without) as repeated factors. The results of these
analyses are portrayed in Fig. 2, Panels A and B.
For accuracy, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect was a strong deleterious
eﬀect of Interference, F(1, 39) = 40.81, p < 0.001, Ƞ2G = 0.14.
Importantly, our prediction of greater accuracy rates in the Interference
condition relative to the Interference+Reminder condition was not
conﬁrmed, t(39)=−0.77, p=0.78; numerically, the former condition
actually yielded slightly better memory. For response times, the analysis
revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Interference, F(1, 39)= 8.54,
p < .01, Ƞ2G=0.013, and a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Reminder, F(1,
39)= 6.77, p < 0.05, Ƞ2G=0.01, with no interaction between these
factors. Our prediction of reduced response times in the Interference
condition relative to the Interference+Reminder condition was not
conﬁrmed, t(39)=−1.32, p=0.9; rather, a trend in the opposite di-
rection emerged.
We then analyzed the eﬀects of reminder and interference manip-
ulations on the relative proportions of reported 'Remember' responses,
representing more subjective aspects of memory. Due to ﬁle corruption,
these data were only available for 35 of the 40 participants. A 2×2
repeated measures ANOVA was used, with percent of correct
'Remember' responses out of all correct responses (i.e., correct
Remember/(correct Remember+ correct Know) as the dependent
measure (Fig. 2, Panel C). The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main ef-
fect of Interference, F(1, 34)= 4.91, p < .05, Ƞ2G = 0.02, and a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of Reminder, F(1, 34) = 11.8, p < 0.01, Ƞ2G =
0.03, showing (somewhat surprisingly) a signiﬁcant lower proportion
of correct Remember responses following reminders. As predicted, our
planned comparison yielded a lower percentage of correct Remember
responses in the Reminder+ Interference compared to the Interference
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condition, t(34) = 2.61, p < 0.01. However, since for this measure,
the reminders also yielded a main eﬀect of decreasing Remember re-
sponding (that is, a similar decrease was observed for the Reminder
condition relative to the Encoding-only condition), the lower propor-
tion of Remember responding in the Reminder+ Interference condition
relative to the Interference condition is likely due to inclusion of a re-
minder in the former, and does not provide evidence that the reminders
had an interactive eﬀect with interference.
Our main prediction, of weaker, slower, or less richly recollective
memory following interference preceded by a reminder than following
interference alone was generally not borne out by these analyses. As
with any form of classical null-hypothesis testing, however, absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence. We therefore adopted recent pro-
posals to use Bayesian factors to compare null and alternate hypotheses.
We used a one-sided Bayesian t-test with a Cauchy prior scaled at sqrt
(2)/2 (medium scaling), to compare two hypotheses: that the accuracy
rates in the Interference condition do no diﬀer from accuracy rates in
the Interference+Reminder condition (that is, that standardized eﬀect
size is 0; the so-called “null hypothesis”), or that accuracy rates in the
Interference condition are higher than in the Interference+Reminder
condition (that is, that the standardized eﬀect size is bigger than 0).
This analysis supported the null hypothesis, which was preferred by a
Bayes factor of 9.71. We ran the same analysis for reaction times, this
time contrasting the null hypothesis with the alternate hypothesis of
reduced reaction times in the Interference condition relative to the
Interference+Reminder condition. For this analysis, the null hypoth-
esis was preferred by a Bayes factor of 12.63. The data thus provide
strong evidence against the hypothesis of reduced memory following
interference that is preceded by a reminder. Finally, we ran this analysis
for the proportion of correct Remember responses, which yielded
moderate evidence in support of the alternate hypothesis (BF=6.6). As
previously noted, however, given that this measure shows a general
decrease in the proportion of correct Remember responses following a
reminder even without interference, this result does not provide evi-
dence that the reminders had an interactive eﬀect with interference.
2.3. Discussion
In our ﬁrst examination of the potential eﬀects of reminder-po-
tentiated interference, we failed to ﬁnd such interactive eﬀects on ei-
ther objective (accuracy and response times) or subjective (reported
strength of recollection). The predicted interaction between Reminder
and Interference manipulations was not observed despite the fact that
both manipulations individually did signiﬁcantly inﬂuence either ac-
curacy or response time measures.
An unexpected ﬁnding in Experiment 1 was that the Encoding-only
condition was characterized by a higher percentage of correct
'Remember' responses than the (marginally more accurate) Reminder
condition. It is not clear why this eﬀect was obtained. We speculate that
perhaps the reminder activation of the ‘gist’ memory of the item type in
the absence of re-viewing of the particular stimulus led to a decline in
subjective re-experiencing at retrieval, even while improving the ob-
jective memory for that stimulus.
Our failure to observe the expected interactive eﬀect of reminder on
interference led us to wonder it was absent because the reminders were
all presented in a single list, while the interfering stimuli were
Fig. 2. Accuracy (Panel A), response time (Panel B), and the proportion of 'Remember' compared to 'Know' responses following correct recognition judgments (Panel C) measures, for the
two-alternative forced choice picture recognition test in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate SEM.
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presented in a later phase of the session. That might have resulted in
some fashion in the resetting of reminder-based activation before the
interference aﬀected the memory traces. In Experiment 2, we therefore
went on to employ a slightly diﬀerent experimental paradigm, in which
the reminders and the interfering stimuli are presented in close proxi-
mity, interleaved in a single series of alternating judgments. If proxi-
mity of reminder and interference is crucial for interactive eﬀects to
emerge, this paradigm should yield stronger evidence of the interaction.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were 40 healthy young adults (10 males; mean age
22.1 years, SD=3.0 years, range 19–31), with normal or adjusted-to-
normal vision. All were undergraduate students who volunteered in
return for academic requirement credit or payment. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants for a protocol approved by the
Interdisciplinary Center's Institutional Review Board. One other parti-
cipant was excluded from the analyses due to failure to properly follow
instructions, as indicated by random performance.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Materials, Day 1 study procedures, and Day 3 test procedures were
identical to Experiment 1. On Day 2 of the experiment, participants
were reminded of 100 objects and exposed to interfering exemplar
pictures of 100 objects, creating the same four conditions as in
Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2, the two activities of Day 2
were interleaved. Each trial unit began with a reminder phase, in which
participants were shown an object name and asked to report how well
they remember the actual picture of that object from the previous day,
using 3 buttons on the keyboard; “clearly”/“hardly”/“not at all”. In
contrast to Experiment 1, however, immediately after each such report,
they were shown an object from a diﬀerent list (an Interference object;
i.e., if participants saw an object from list A on Day 1, they saw either
an object from list B or C), which they were again asked to memorize
for a memory test. For half of the trials, the interference object was an
alternate exemplar of the same object that was just reminded (be-
coming a case of the Reminder+ Interference condition), and for the
other half, the interference was an alternate exemplar of a diﬀerent
object than the one just reminded (such that the reminded stimulus
became a case of Reminder condition, and the alternate exemplar be-
came a case of Interference condition). As in Experiment 1, participants
were asked to perform three tasks for each interference object; liking,
symmetry and color judgment, as described above. The next trial unit
began with the next name-cued memory assessment as a reminder. This
procedure yielded the same four conditions as Experiment 1, the only
diﬀerence being that the Reminder, Interference, and
Reminder+ Interference conditions were all created in the same pro-
cess on Day 2; the Encoding-only condition stimuli were, as in
Experiment 1, only seen on Day 1.
Day 3 accuracy and response time measures were collected as in
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, following completion of all memory
tests on Day 3, participants were shown pictures from the set of that
they had seen on the ﬁrst day and asked to record their names. Items for
Fig. 3. Accuracy (Panel A), response time (Panel B), and the proportion of 'Remember' compared to 'Know' responses following correct recognition judgments (Panel C) measures for two-
alternative forced choice picture recognition test in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate SEM.
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which names were given that were substantively diﬀerent than the
names used for reminders on Day 2 were removed from subsequent
analyses for that participant. On average, 1.85 items per participant
were thus removed, with a maximum of 10 items removed in one
participant. Trials in which response times (RTs) were three standard
deviations or more longer than the individual participant's other RTs
were removed from RT analyses.
3.2. Results
As in the prior experiment, we examined the eﬀects of reminder,
interference and the interaction between them in repeated measures
ANOVAs for accuracy, response times, and proportion of Remember
responses following correct recognition judgments, as portrayed in
Fig. 3. For accuracy, this revealed a main eﬀect of interference, F(1,
39)= 12.96, p < 0.001, Ƞ2G = 0.05, with reduced accuracy rates
following interference, a main eﬀect of reminder, F(1, 39) = 16.63,
p < 0.001, Ƞ2G = 0.03, with increased accuracy rates following re-
minders, and no interaction between the two factors. Critically, our
planned comparison between Interference and Inter-
ference+Reminder did not support our prediction, t(39)=−1.57,
p=0.94. For response times, the analysis only revealed a main eﬀect of
interference, F(1, 39) = 9.24, p < 0.005, Ƞ2G= 0.003, and no support
for our prediction, t(39) = 1.56, p=0.94. Finally, for the proportion of
correct Remember responses, the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of interference, F(1, 39) = 9.56, p < 0.005, Ƞ2G=0.015, as
well as a signiﬁcant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 39) =
5.88, p < 0.05, Ƞ2G = 0.01. Nevertheless, decomposition of the in-
teraction revealed that it is driven by an unexpected increase in pro-
portion of Remember responses in the Encoding-only condition com-
pared to the Reminder condition, t(39) = 2.99, p < 0.01, but only
when there was no interference. In other words, the predicted diﬀer-
ence between Interference vs. Interference+Reminder was not ob-
served, t(39)=−0.42, p=0.66.
Our main prediction, of poorer memory following interference
preceded by a reminder than following interference alone, was thus not
borne out by these ANOVAs in this experiment either. As in Experiment
1, we further scrutinized these patterns of results by examining
Bayesian factors to compare null and alternate hypotheses. These
analyses revealed strong support for the null hypotheses of no diﬀer-
ence between the Reminder condition and the Reminder+ Interference
condition, for both accuracy (BF=13.97) and reaction times
(BF= 13.9), and moderate support for the null hypothesis regarding
the proportion of Remember responses (BF= 7.86).
3.3. Discussion
In this experiment, we observed tangible eﬀects on remembering of
both reminder and interference manipulations alone, the former
strengthening memory and the latter weakening it, but did not observe
potentiation of interference by reminders. This was obtained under
conditions of interleaved processing of reminders and interference.
Thus, the absence of the eﬀect that we observed in Experiment 1 cannot
be attributed to insuﬃcient interaction between the reminder and in-
terference stages.
It is interesting to note that unlike Experiment 1, here memory for
the Reminder condition was signiﬁcantly stronger than the Encoding-
only condition. It is possible that such an eﬀect emerged because in this
paradigm the reminders are given just before the interfering stimuli.
This may cause the reminders to become diﬀerentially more eﬃcient in
strengthening memory for the original items when they are not fol-
lowed by speciﬁc interference by a competing version of the same sti-
mulus, possibly due to more elaborative (re)encoding of the original
stimulus.
We were left with the question of why we did not observe the
predicted potentiation of interference by reminder activation of target
representations. One reason for the absence of such eﬀects might be
that the reminder employed, directly referencing the previously en-
coded stimuli, was so strong that it overshadowed the reminder mod-
ulation of interference. Indeed, several studies have put forth the claim
that only weak reminders will lead to reconsolidation interference (e.g.,
Hupbach, 2011), although such claims are not supported by a recent
meta-analysis of reconsolidation studies (Scully et al., 2017). To ex-
amine this possibility, in Experiment 3 we used a very weak reminder,
i.e., one that made no explicit reference to the encoding episode. Ra-
ther, participants were presented with pairs of object names, and asked
to decide which was more expensive. This deep encoding task requires
making reference to the semantic information related to the object
name, which by spreading activation might minimally activate re-
presentations of the studied object picture without bringing it to con-
sciousness. This manipulation was only applied to half of the stimulus
exemplars, providing a parallel structure with the four conditions of the
two prior experiments. If weak reminders can potentiate interference,
then this manipulation might be expected to yield such eﬀects.
4. Experiment 3
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 40 healthy young adults (5 males; mean age
20.9 years, SD=2.6 years, range 19–31), with normal or adjusted-to-
normal vision. All were undergraduate students who volunteered in
return for academic requirement credit or payment. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants for a protocol approved by the
Interdisciplinary Center's Institutional Review Board.
4.1.2. Procedure
Day 1 of the experiment was executed with the same protocol as in
the two prior experiments. On Day 2, participants performed two tasks.
In the ﬁrst task, they were shown the names of 100 of the items that
they had studied on Day 1, in horizontal pairs, midscreen and spaced
for comfortable reading, in a black 18-point font on a white back-
ground. They were asked to indicate which item they thought is more
expensive, by pressing either the right or left of two designated keys on
a standard keyboard (marked with stickers as 'R' or 'L'). The selection of
the 100 item names presented for this pricing judgment (out of 200
items studied on the previous day), and the relative location of each
item onscreen, was counterbalanced across participants. The second
task of Day 2 was an interference manipulation, which was conducted
as in Experiment 1.
On Day 3, participants performed a two-alternative forced choice
recognition tasks, initially choosing the exemplar studied on Day 1 as in
Experiments 1 and 2. However, in this experiment, we employed a more
continuous measure of memory strength than the Remember/Know
judgments used previously. Here, in each trial participants were asked
to provide a rating of their conﬁdence in the recognition judgment they
had made, using a 5-point scale (with a guide indicating: 5= absolutely
sure, 4= fairly sure, 3= feeling of knowing without strong conﬁdence,
2= very weak memory, 1= totally guessing). We made this change
with the rationale that perhaps providing a continuous scale of sub-
jective remembering might reveal eﬀects that were hidden by the
binary character of the Remember/Know responses. Accuracy, response
time, and conﬁdence measures were collected, and analyzed using the
same methods as in the prior experiments.
4.2. Results
As in the prior experiments, we examined the eﬀects of reminder,
interference and the interaction between them in repeated measures
ANOVAs for the dependent measures of accuracy and response times.
We ran an additional ANOVA, with the same independent variables,
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and with mean conﬁdence rating as the dependent measure. For all of
these measures (Fig. 4), the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of interference, [for accuracy: F(1, 39) = 67.35, p < 0.001, Ƞ2G =
0.2; for response times: F(1, 39) = 18.61, p < 0.001, Ƞ2G = 0.02; for
conﬁdence: F(1, 39) = 4.93, p < 0.05, Ƞ2G = 0.03], but no other
signiﬁcant eﬀects. In addition, our planned comparison revealed no
advantage for the Interference condition over the Inter-
ference+Reminder condition in any of these measures [for accuracy: t
(39) = 0.05, p=0.48; for response times: t(39) = 1.47, p=0.08; for
conﬁdence: t(39) = 0.37, p=0.35].
Finally, in this experiment Bayesian analyses provided moderate
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis for accuracy rates (BF=5.66)
and for conﬁdence (BF=4.28) and anecdotal evidence in favor of the
null hypothesis for reaction times (BF=1.19). Importantly, however,
the prediction of worse memory following interference preceded by a
reminder than following interference alone was not conﬁrmed in this
experiment either.
5. General discussion
In three separate experiments, we attempted to disrupt re-
consolidation of episodic object-picture memory using a re-
minder+ retroactive interference manipulation. We applied the ma-
nipulation in a within-subjects paradigm, using a forced-choice
recognition test without an intrusion component (i.e., no stimuli from
Day 2 were presented in the memory tests to cause interference-to-
target confusion), keeping all other study and test parameters constant.
No eﬀects of reminder-potentiated interference were observed for
measures of accuracy, response times, subjective expressions of re-
collection, or levels of conﬁdence, in any of these experiments, as
substantiated by Bayesian analyses. Seemingly, the alternative ex-
emplars presented on Day 2 engendered classic cue-overload retro-
active interference that caused diﬃculties in discrimination between
originally studied exemplars and novel foils on Day 3, but may not have
disrupted the stored representations themselves.
A key motivation of the present study was to determine whether
reminder-potentiated reconsolidation interference in episodic memory
could be demonstrated within-subjects. Consonant with the report of
Zhu et al. (2016), we were not successful in eliciting that eﬀect. The
question remains why such eﬀects were not obtained in the present
research despite being reported in other studies. We will consider
several possible factors that might account for this.
The ﬁrst possible factor is the strength of the reminder used to cause
pre-interference reactivation. The primary diﬀerence between the three
experimental paradigms herein reported was the strength of the re-
activation of the consolidated target memory before interference.
Hupbach et al. (2007) have asserted that strong, direct reactivations
should induce less memory change than indirect reactivations, as strong
reactivation might strengthen the original representation through re-
hearsal and vitiate the eﬀects of interference. However, a meta-analysis
of reconsolidation eﬀects by Scully et al. (2017) did not conﬁrm that
assertion, with eﬀect sizes not found to be modulated by reactivation
Fig. 4. Accuracy (Panel A), response time (Panel B), and conﬁdence (Panel C) measures for two-alternative forced choice picture recognition test in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate
SEM.
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methods. Accordingly, any of the methods we employed might in
principle have led to reconsolidation interference – though in practice
they did not.
Similarly, it might be argued that the object names employed as
reminders do not actually trigger reconsolidation at all, and that the
original memories are not made labile by those reminders. This seems a
less likely possibility in Exps. 1 and 2 in which the names were cues for
the assessment of memory strength of the individual items, but might
be relevant to Exp. 3 in which the names of the objects were presented
in the context of a cognitive judgment unrelated to the encoding epi-
sode. However, given that in other studies purporting to observe re-
consolidation interference, the triggering of labilization was attributed
to reactivation engendered by a general reminder of the encoding
context, the repeated semantic processing of the name of a studied
object employed in that experiment seems more likely to yield re-
activation of the studied item.
Another possibility is that since the recognition test we employed
can be performed using familiarity without need for recollection
(Yonelinas, 2002), the absence of a reconsolidation interference eﬀect
might be because the memory test was not suﬃciently challenging.
However, since in this study lures were the same item types as the
studied targets, detailed memory and not gist familiarity was required
for correct recognition. We chose the three-exemplar target-inter-
ference-foil paradigm precisely because in this paradigm speciﬁc ret-
roactive interference to the representation of the studied target makes it
diﬃcult for participants to distinguish it from a novel foil of the same
object type. In other words, the similarity between targets, interferers,
and foils makes it more challenging to retrieve the speciﬁc structural/
perceptual features of the target. Indeed, performance was far from
ceiling, and many participants found the task quite challenging.
Importantly, the meta-analysis of Scully et al. (2017) indicated that
memory test type (recall or recognition) did not aﬀect the degree of the
reactivation-induced memory change. Therefore, it might have been
expected that we ﬁnd the eﬀect on recognition, but this was not ob-
served. Furthermore, the results show that there was no eﬀect on the
proportions of correct ’Remember’ responses, which indicates that the
eﬀect is not absent just because participants are making familiarity-
based judgments.
Another possible reason that we did not ﬁnd evidence for re-
consolidation interference is that the reminder-interference manipula-
tion was conducted only 24 h after the original learning. While the
intervening night sleep should aﬀord some degree of consolidation, a
meta-analysis of reconsolidation eﬀects by Scully et al. (2017) indicated
that reactivation before interference only moderately aﬀected mem-
ories that were between 24 and 48 h old, yielding more signiﬁcant
changes in memories greater than one week old. For example, among
the cases of behavioral reconsolidation interference in episodic
memory, Schwabe and Wolf (2009; using a recognition test for emo-
tional and neutral pictures) and Wirkner, Löw, Hamm, and Weymar
(2015; using story recall) observed the eﬀects of reactivation on in-
terference when memory was tested one week after encoding. Wichert,
Wolf, and Schwabe (2011) found evidence for retrieval-potentiated
interference with recall of neutral and emotional pictures, when the
interference was administered 7 days after, but not 1 day or 28 days
after encoding. Summarizing ﬁndings from a variety of reconsolidation
studies (including those that used pharmacological interventions),
Scully et al. (2017) propose that very recent memories are not suﬃ-
ciently consolidated, such that subsequent manipulations might equally
aﬀect both reactivated and non-reactivated memories. The possibility of
ﬁnding reconsolidation interference using the present methods with
much longer consolidation intervals might be examined in future stu-
dies.
Finally, it could be argued that the form of interference we em-
ployed, involving competing exemplars of the studied stimuli, itself
served as a reminder, such that any observed eﬀects of interference are
necessarily eﬀects of reconsolidation interference. We believe that this
aspect of the procedures cannot fully account for the reported results,
for several reasons. Firstly, while in Experiment 1 the reminder activity
and the interference activity were blocked (such that participants ﬁrst
performed the reminder activity for all objects, and then the inter-
ference activity), in Experiment 2 these two activities were interleaved.
Thus in Experiment 2, participants viewed an object name triggering
recall of the original image, and then immediately viewed a diﬀerent
image. In this procedure, there is an immediate mismatch between the
two instances of the object (the retrieved and the viewed), and so the
design of Experiment 2 seems to induce increased prediction error (PE)
relative to the design of Experiment 1. It has been asserted that PE is
mandatory during reactivation session in order to initiate reconsolida-
tion, and that memory reconsolidation depends on the amount of PE
(reviewed by Fernández, Boccia, & Pedreira, 2016). Therefore, we
would expect to observe reminder-potentiated reconsolidation inter-
ference eﬀects at least in Exp. 2, but that was not apparent. Secondly,
we have grounds to expect that the pre-interference reminder would
engender diﬀerential eﬀects above and beyond the reminder strength of
the interference stimuli. In the application of reconsolidation inter-
ference to extinction of fear conditioning (e.g., Schiller et al., 2010;
Agren et al., 2012), the extinction training certainly serves as a re-
minder of the conditioning no less than the alternative exemplars pre-
sented in the interference stage of the current study. Yet, in those stu-
dies, the presentation of a reminder cue a few minutes before the
beginning of extinction training has a strong eﬀect on the eﬃcacy of the
extinction. The extinction of conditioning is indeed a diﬀerent type of
memory process than episodic interference. However, to the extent
that, as a general principle, reminder-based activation of previously
acquired traces leaves such representations more vulnerable to inter-
ference, we should have seen diﬀerentially weaker subsequent memory
in the reminder condition in the current paradigm – but did not. Thus,
while the possibility that the interfering images also served as re-
minders cannot be completely ruled out, we were not able to engender
any interaction between prior reminders and that interference proce-
dure.
It should be noted that in several of the prior studies reporting re-
minder-potentiated reconsolidation interference, such eﬀects were ex-
pressed not in forgetting of studied materials, but in intrusion eﬀects –
essentially source memory failures, in which items from distractor lists
are reported as belonging to target lists (Hupbach et al., 2007;
Hupbach, Hardt, Gomez, & Nadel, 2008; Hupbach, Gomez, & Nadel,
2009; Simon, Gómez, Nadel, & Scalf, 2017; Wichert et al., 2013).
Hupbach and colleagues have argued that such intrusions do not only
reﬂect source memory failures, since they were generally unidirectional
(i.e., later objects were reported as part of the activated-interfered list,
but not vice versa; Hupbach et al., 2009). However, such uni-
directionality cannot be assessed by counterbalanced interference, and
may be an inseparable part of the experimental paradigm. Re-
consolidation interference evidenced by retrieval failure outside the
domain of intrusions remains quite sparse.
Although initial ﬁndings of behavioral reconsolidation interference
generated excitement about theoretical and applicative implications of
the phenomenon, there have been some recent reports of failures to ﬁnd
this eﬀect. For example, Hardwicke and colleagues (Hardwicke &
Shanks, 2016; Hardwicke, Taqi, & Shanks, 2016) have reported that
reconsolidation interference could not be demonstrated for procedural
learning. In clinical applications of reconsolidation interference to the
treatment of phobia (fear of ﬂying), Maples-Keller et al. (2017) found
no eﬀect of the intervention on reported anxiety or behaviors, although
they did observe eﬀects on physiological measures of arousal. Jones,
Pest, Vargas, Glisky, and Fellous (2015) failed to ﬁnd eﬀects of context-
reinstatement potentiation of reconsolidation interference on object
recall in older adults. Similarly, the studies herein reported failed to
demonstrate reconsolidation interference to object picture recognition
in a within-subject paradigm, despite numerous attempts to titrate re-
minder strength parameters. These ﬁndings, like those of Hardwicke
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and colleagues, do not necessarily represent evidence belying the
phenomenon. However, these data underscore the evanescence of be-
havioral reconsolidation interference in human episodic memory, and
provide some indications of what might be boundary conditions for its
demonstration.
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